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ABSTRACT 
Education positively affects a person's income. It can be explained in two ways. Firstly, education 
directly increases the productivity of a person, which is in accordance with the views of the theory of 
human capital. The second way is an indirect effect, in which education acts as a sign (signal) of a 
worker’s unobserved characteristics, as assessed by an employer who is considering hiring the 
person. This is consistent with the view of the signaling theory. Both views are often debated in 
literature. This paper examines the returns to education in Indonesia, separating out the credential 
effects from the pure years of schooling effects. We used survey data from the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) 2000, 2007, and 2014 to test the difference of the two theories in estimating the returns 
to education in Indonesia. This study used three models which consisted of the human capital model, 
the signaling model, and the hybrid model. The human capital model used the number of years of 
schooling as a variable representing education, the signaling model used dummy variables from the 
level of education achieved (elementary school, junior high school, senior high school, diploma, 
university), and the hybrid model combined both measures of the variables. The hybrid model allows 
for the separation of the impact of human capital based on an additional year of schooling, and the 
impact of signaling by the accomplishment of a particular certificate. The results of the study provide 
strong evidence of the presence of the returns to education either through the human capital or the 
signaling theories.  
Keywords: education, human capital, signaling, returns to education 
JEL codes: I20, J30 
INTRODUCTION  
The positive relationship between wages/ 
earnings and education in the income equation 
has been proven by previous research (Psacharo-
poulos, 1994; Card, 1999; Selz-Laurière & 
Thélot, 2004). Most research has used Mincer’s 
specification as the basis of its modeling.1 The 
																																								 																				
1  Mincer’s specification is the equation of income 
associated with education and working experience 
(Mincer, 1974)  
relationship between education and increasing 
wages is explained in two ways: 1) Directly, 
where education increases people’s productivity; 
2) indirectly, where education is positively 
correlated with the nature of labor productivity 
that cannot be directly observed by the 
employer.  
For the first relationship, the most common 
explanation for these correlations has been that 
time spent in school or on the job increases 
wages by directly increasing the workers’ 
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productivity. This learning explanation is usually 
related with the human capital theory. In the case 
of the second relationship, those with more 
schooling tend to earn more, is not only because 
schooling makes them more productive, but 
because schooling acts as a credential. This 
learning description is usually related with the 
screening theory. This shows that education is a 
signal to employers to assess the abilities of their 
workers (Weiss, 1995). 
Economists accept the human capital and 
signaling theories to be the dominant explana-
tions of the labor market’s returns to education. 
Distinguishing between these theories empiri-
cally is infamously difficult (Willis, 1986). One 
suggested distinction between the two theories is 
the presence of the diploma effects, the parti-
cularly high returns for completing a degree over 
and above completing a given amount of educa-
tion (Hungerford & Solon, 1987; Belman & 
Heywood, 1991, 1997; Jaeger & Page, 1996; 
Frazis, 2002). 
The most economists accept human capital 
theories to be explanations of the labor market’s 
returns to education with Mincer’s specification. 
The interpretation from the empirical findings 
using Mincer’s specification is very clear. It 
states that each additional year of education will 
increase wages to the same degree. The 
interpretation above is consistent with the view 
of the human capital theory. 
 Challenging this analysis are the education 
screening theories, which state that education is 
only a tool for signaling the abilities of a person 
which can be used in the workplace (Shabbir, 
1991). Proponents of the screening theory argue 
that the higher income of a person who has a 
higher level of education really reflects an 
appreciation for their inherent capabilities (latent 
abilities) as workers, as sought by their employ-
ers. Someone that has a better education tends to 
earn a higher salary. This is not because of their 
education, but because of their certificates or 
diplomas (Hungerford & Solon, 1987). 
The discussions about the two views of the 
relationship between education and wages are 
still limited in the case of Indonesia. This 
motivated the authors to write this paper. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the 
differences of both the theories in estimating the 
returns to education in Indonesia. We used micro 
data from IFLS 3, IFLS 4, and IFLS 5 in 
estimating the returns. The estimation of the 
returns to education is made in three models 
used to achieve the research objectives. The 
results of this paper are expected to become 
inputs into the education policy of Indonesia. 
This paper starts with the introduction, and 
then the literature review is in Section two. 
Furthermore, Section three describes the 
education system and the labor system in 
Indonesia, and Section four describes the data 
and a summary of the statistics. The next section 
discusses the empirical strategy. Section six 
describes the results of the regression analysis, 
and the last section contains the conclusion. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Human capital refers to all the attributes of 
workers that potentially increase their 
productivity in all or some productive tasks 
(Acemoglu, 2007). The difference in human 
capital leads to differences in productivity, 
which in turn causes differences in wages. The 
sources of these human capital differences are 
innate ability, schooling, the schools’ quality and 
non-schooling investment, training, and pre-
labor market influences (Acemoglu & Autor, 
2009). Schooling is the source of human capital 
differences that is often used by researchers. The 
longer individuals go to school, the greater is 
their human capital. The larger the human 
capital is, the greater the reward is.  
The references to returns to education began 
to develop after Mincer (1974) made the specific 
relationship between income/wages to achieved 
educational attainment, especially after many 
surveys at the individual level, conducted in 
many countries. Card (1999) provided additional 
references to the methodology for estimating the 
rate of returns to education. Card discussed some 
ways to reduce the refraction of the OLS 
estimation on Mincer’s specification. Card 
provided solutions such as using twin indivi-
dual’s data and the Instrument Variable (IV). 
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The marginal rate of returns to education 
using Mincer’s specification is the same 
(constant) for each additional year of education. 
There is no influence from a certain educational 
level (for example, nine years for junior high 
school, 12 years for high school, and 16 years 
for college) in the case of this constant marginal. 
If these conditions are not fulfilled, we can state 
that there is an impact from graduation, or what 
is known as the Sheepskin effect. This effect can 
also be used to test the signaling hypothesis, 
because the independent variable used is a 
dummy of a certificate at a certain level. 
Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) rejected 
the signaling hypothesis because they did not 
find evidence to support the Sheepskin 
prediction, where the income of graduates is 
higher than that of those who dropped out of 
school. These results were used as evidence 
against the signaling hypothesis. The following 
research generally supported the signaling 
hypothesis by finding evidence of the Sheepskin 
effect, for example Hungerford and Solon (1987) 
and Belman and Heywood (1991). 
Hungerford and Solon (1987) and Belman 
and Heywood (1991) proved the existence of the 
Sheepskin effect in America by using the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). They used the 
common Mincer equation by treating the log 
linear relationship of wages and years of 
schooling as a spline function that is discon-
tinuous at each point of the years of school 
graduated. They added limited variable controls 
to the models, such as potential experience, 
potential experience squared, gender and race. 
They used the models to estimate the Sheepskin 
effect with a spline function and a step function. 
They noticed a great unusual improvement in the 
relationship between income and education in a 
certain year, such as 12 years (high school 
graduates) and 16 years (university graduates). 
The weakness of their study was the absence of 
data that differentiated between graduates and 
dropouts. In principle, the Sheepskin effect is the 
difference in income between graduates of the 
schooling system, and those who dropped out, so 
that both sets of data are important. 
Xiu and Gunderson (2013) used the data 
from the China Household Income Project 
(CHIP) in 1995 and 2002 to explain the 
education returns in China, which separated the 
effects of graduation from the net impact of the 
years of schooling. The empirical results 
demonstrated an increased return of education 
when graduating from a certain level. This 
research contributed to the school returns 
literature in China, in such a way that it can 
distinguish separately the impact of the 
productivity of human capital for each additional 
year of successfully completed education, with 
graduation signaling the achievement of a 
particular education level. The second contri-
bution was the use of a measurement of income 
and working experience that was more accurate 
than that used in previous studies. The last 
contribution was to connect the returns of 
education in the transition circumstances which 
China was facing, due to its wider open market 
economy orientation. 
EDUCATION SYSTEM AND LABOR 
SYSTEM IN INDONESIA 
1. Education System 
The education system in Indonesia is divided 
into three main types, namely formal, non-
formal and informal education. Formal 
education is conducted in schools while non-
formal and informal education is conducted 
outside the school system. Formal education is 
divided into three levels, namely the basic 
education (primary), intermediate (secondary) 
and higher (tertiary). Primary education consists 
of elementary school or madrasah ibtidaiah and 
junior high school or madrasah tsanawiyah. 
Secondary education consists of senior high 
school, madrasah aliyah, and vocational school 
(SMK). Figure 1 illustrates the complete Indone-
sian education system in accordance with the 
Law No. 20 of 2003. The numbers on the left 
side of Figure 1 shows individual average ages 
at a particular school level. 
The institution in charge of education in 
Indonesia is the Kemendiknas (the Ministry of 
National Education) and Kemenag (the Ministry 
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of Religious Affairs). Based on Law No. 20 of 
2003, public schools, in either the public or 
private sector, are under the supervision of the 
Ministry of National Education, while Islamic 
schools, both public and private are under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
The informal education consists of courses, 
internships, Paket A, Paket B, Paket C, 
playgroups and childcare. The institution in 
charge of courses, internships, Paket A, Paket B, 
and Paket C is the Ministry of National 
Education, while playgroups and nurseries are 
under the supervision of the Ministry of National 
Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
According to Law No. 20 year 2003 on the 
Indonesian education system, as illustrated in 
Figure 1, the duration of the schooling (the 
number of years of schooling) for each level of 
education is described in Table 1. 
 
Age Education level Type of Education 
        
 
Higher 
Education 
Islamic 
Doctorate 
Program (S3) 
Doctorate 
Program (S3) 
Specialist II 
Program 
 (SP II) 
   
    
    
 Islamic Master 
Program 
Master 
Program(S2) 
Specialist I 
(SP I) 
   
    
22 
Islamic 
Graduate 
Program (S1) 
Graduate 
Degree 
Program (S1) 
Diploma 4 
Program 
(D4) 
   
21 Diploma 3   
20 Diploma 2  
19 Diploma 1 
18 Secondary 
Education 
Islamic Upper 
Secondary School 
General Upper 
Secondary School 
Vocational Upper 
Secondary School 17 16 
15 
Basic 
Education 
Islamic Lower 
Secondary School Junior Secondary School 14 13 
12 
Islamic Primary 
School Primary School 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 Pre School Islamic Kindergarten  Kindergarten 5 
        
 School Education  Out-of-School Education 
>22 Higher Education Post Graduate   
Courses 
Family 
Education 
19 – 22 Higher Education Graduate/Diploma   
    
      Apprenticeship 
 
Paket C 
16-18 Secondary School General    
      
      Paket B 
 
Paket A 
13-15 Lower Secondary School   
7-12 Primary School   
      Playgroup       
5-6 Kindergarten   Day Care Center       
Source: Kemendiknas2 
Figure 1. Education System in Indonesia, Law No. 20 2003 
																																								 																				
2	http://www.indonesianembassy.org.uk/education, date 21/7/2014	
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Table 1. Education Level and Years of 
Schooling 
Years of schooling Education Level 
6 
9 
12 
14 
16 
Primary School 
Junior High School 
Senior High School 
Diploma Degree 
Scholar/Master’s Degree 
2. Labor System 
The labor market in Indonesia, according to 
the definition by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) described by the 
National Labor Force Survey (Survei Angkatan 
Kerja Nasional, SAKERNAS), is divided into 
ten business fields. They are agricultural crops, 
plantations, fisheries, animal husbandry, other 
agricultural aspects, industrial processing, trade, 
services, transport, and others. 
In Indonesia, many workers have low levels 
of education. The numbers of workers with low 
education levels (elementary and below) far 
outnumber workers with other levels of 
education. For example in 2013, these less 
educated workers consisted of more than 47 
percent of the workforce (equal to 54.62 million 
people).
 
Table 2.  Workers Aged 15 Years and Over Who Work According to their Attainment Education, 
2011-2013 (million people) 
Attainment Education 
2011 2012 2013 
February August February August February 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elementry school and less 55.12 54.18 55.51 53.88 54.62 
Junior high school 21.22 20.70 20.29 20.22 20.29 
Senior high school 16.35 17.11 17.20 17.25 17.77 
Vocational school 9.73 8.86 9.43 9.50 10.18 
Diploma I/II/III 3.32 3.17 3.12 2.98 3.22 
University 5.54 5.65 7.25 6.98 7.94 
Total 111.28 109.67 112.80 110.81 114.02 
Source: BPS3 
 
Table 3.  Workers Aged 15 Years and Over Who Worked According to their Main Employment 
Status, 2011-2013 (million people) 
Main Employment Status 
2011 2012 2013 
February August February August February August 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Work Alone 21.28 18.75 19.72 18.75 19.50 19.21 
Employer assisted by temporary workers 21.16 19.70 20.69 19.24 19.94 19.35 
Employer assisted by permanent workers 3.60 3.65 3.98 3.96 4.13 3.86 
Laborer/employee 35.01 36.91 38.59 40.87 42.05 41.12 
Free workers in agriculture 5.60 5.30 5.40 5.41 5.10 5.20 
Free worker in non agriculture 5.22 5.53 6.00 6.23 6.46 6.06 
Workers family/Unpaid 20.18 17.57 19.69 18.06 18.74 17.97 
Total 112.05 107.42 114.06 112.50 115.93 112.76 
Source: BPS4 
 
																																								 																				
3 http://www.bps.go.id/brs_file/naker, date 8/8/2014 
4 http://www.bps.go.id/brs_file/naker, date 8/8/2014 
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The employment status of Indonesian 
workers has increased. Table 3 shows Indo-
nesian workers by their main employment 
statuses. The main employment status is the 
employment status of a person at his/her place of 
work or the establishment where he/she is 
employed. There are seven employment statuses 
based on the BPS definition. They are self-
employed, self-employed with the help of 
temporary workers, self-employed with the help 
of permanent workers, laborers, agricultural free 
workers, non-agricultural free workers, and 
unpaid workers. An unpaid worker is a person 
who works in an establishment run by another 
member of the family, a neighbor or a volunteer 
worker, in order to earn some form of income, 
but not a wage.  
The increase in the laborer/employee status 
is about 2.7 percent every year. The other 
increasing employment statuses are self-
employed with the help of permanent workers 
and non-agricultural free workers. The increase 
in both of these is under one percent. The other 
employment status has decreased by an average 
of less than one percent per year, and the highest 
decline is in the self-employed status. 
The wages in Indonesia are regulated by 
Law No. 13 of 2003. The income or wages of 
workers in Indonesia are quite varied. A regional 
minimum wage is used as a reference wage, 
although there are still many small companies or 
family companies paying wages below the 
regional minimum wage. The development of 
the national average minimum wage nominally 
increased over time. Jakarta is the province that 
experienced higher growth than the other 
provinces (Table 4). 
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Data used in this research are the IFLS data 
(Indonesian Family Life Survey) from 2000, 
2007, and 2014. The IFLS is a large-scale 
longitudinal observation of individual and 
household levels of socio-economic status and 
health. The data we used were the criteria of 
workers aged between 15 years and 65 years old 
for each year surveyed, and the education level 
they achieved or if they no longer attend school. 
  
Table 4 The Development of the Regional Minimum Wage 1997-2013 (In Thousand Rupiah) 
Provinces 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2006 2007 2010 2011 2012 2013 
North Sumatera 151.0 174.0 210.0 254.0 340.5 737.8 761.0 965.0 1,035.5 1,200.0 1,375.0 
West Sumatera 119.0 137.0 160.0 200.0 250.0 650.0 750.0 950.0 1,055.0 1,150.0 1,350.0 
South Sumatera 127.5 146.5 170.0 190.0 255.0 604.0 753.0 927.8 1,048.4 1,195.2 1,350.0 
Lampung 126.0 145.0 160.0 192.0 240.0 505.0 555.0 767.5 855.0 975.0 1,150.0 
Jakarta 172.5 198.5 231.0 286.0 426.3 819.1 816.1 1,118.0 1,290.0 1,529.0 2,200.0 
West Java 172.5 176.8 208.8 230.0 245.0 447.7 447.7 671.5 732.0 n.a n.a 
Central Java 113.0 130.0 153.0 185.0 245.0 450.0 500.0 660.0 675.0 n.a n.a 
Yogyakarta 106.5 122.5 130.0 194.5 237.5 460.0 460.0 745.7 808.0 892.7 947.1 
East Java 132.5 143.0 170.5 214.5 220.0 390.0 448.5 630.0 705.0 n.a n.a 
Bali 141.5 162.5 187.0 214.0 309.8 510.0 622.0 829.3 890.0 967.5 1,181.0 
NTB 108.0 124.0 145.0 180.0 240.0 550.0 550.0 890.8 950.0 1,000.0 1,100.0 
South Kalimantan 125.0 144.0 166.0 200.0 295.0 629.0 745.0 1,024.5 1,126.0 1,327.4 1,337.5 
South Sulawesi 112.5 129.5 148.0 200.0 300.0 612.0 673.2 1,000.0 1,100.0 1,200.0 1,440.0 
Mean of Indonesia 135.0 150.9 175.4 216.5 290.5 602.2 667.9 908.8 988.8 1,119.1 1,332.4 
Source: BPS5 
  
																																								 																				
5 http://www.bps.go.id/brs_file/naker  , date 13/1/2015 
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The dependent variable used by the 
researcher was income per month or per year. 
The reason the researcher did not use income per 
hour was because there was no direct question 
that led to the income per hour in the IFLS data. 
The researcher needed to ask some of the other 
questions in the IFLS questionnaire to learn 
people’s income per hour. If this had been 
conducted, the researcher was worried that it 
would lead to bias caused by an error 
measurement. Income in this paper is the income 
earned from working at one’s main job. This 
information was obtained from the IFLS 
questionnaire book 3A TK section.  
The education variable is made from two 
types of measurement in accordance with the 
two theories that we want to compare, they are 
the human capital theory and the signaling 
theory. Firstly, one measurement uses the 
measure of the length or duration of a person’s 
schooling (in years). This measurement is 
consistent with the human capital theory. Data of 
the schooling’s duration are in IFLS’s book 3A 
DL section. The explanation of the education’s 
duration in this research is in accordance with 
the IFLS’s questionnaire and education rules. 
The result is presented in Table 5.  
Secondly, the other measurement uses the 
measure of the last certificate received (the level 
of the highest education completed, for example 
elementary, junior high school, senior high 
school, diploma and bachelor’s degree). This 
second measurement is consistent with the 
signaling theory. Measurement of this variable 
uses the dummy of the schooling’s level. Based 
on the data in Table 6, 19.42 percent of the 
respondents were people who did not graduate 
from elementary school. This shows that the 
proportion is still quite large, therefore, the 
researcher created a dummy for did not graduate 
from elementary school as the basis in the set of 
dummy 𝑪𝑫 (credential). The IFLS questionnaire 
provided an explanation about this measure with 
the question on DL06 and DL07.6 
																																								 																				
6	DL06 is about the highest education level attended 
while DL07 is about the highest grade completed at 
school. 
The experience variable was the total 
number of years from starting work, measured 
through the (𝑎𝑔𝑒 − 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐 − 𝑠,) approach, where 𝑎𝑔𝑒 was the age in 2000, 2007, or 2014, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐 
the duration of schooling, and 𝑠, the age 
schooling started. The definition of experience in 
this case was not only working experience, but 
also life experience, outside of school and at the 
beginning of schooling. Almost all the research 
into returns to education used this approach. The 
age variable was obtained from book 3A; the 
duration of schooling was in accordance with the 
education variable, while the age schooling 
started was at seven years old, according to the 
rules governing education in Indonesia.  
Control variables used in this study included 
the marital status of the respondents, a dummy 
of the city they lived in, their gender and a 
dummy of their employment status. Employment 
status was adjusted, based on the IFLS’s 
questionnaire, and divided into eight types: Self-
employed, self-employed with help from 
temporary workers, self-employed with help 
from permanent workers, government em-
ployees, private sector employees, agricultural 
free workers, non-agricultural free workers and 
unpaid workers. The researcher measured the 
outcome in the form of income, so the unpaid 
workers classification was not included as a 
respondent.  
In addition, the researcher also controlled for 
the province of residence of the respondents in 
the form of a dummy of the province. There 
were 22 provinces where the respondents lived. 
This number had grown from 13 provinces at the 
time of the first survey by the IFLS. This was 
due to two reasons; the first was the develop-
ment of the provinces conducted in 2000. 
Secondly, migration by the respondents after the 
previous survey by the IFLS. In this case, the 
researcher only made 14 dummies of the 
provinces, and one additional dummy for the 
category of other province, because the number 
of respondents outside the 14 provinces was very 
small. In the regression model, the researcher 
used the dummy of DKI province as its basis. 
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Table 5. Duration of Schooling 
Educational Attainment Duration of Schooling (years) 
No Schooling 0 
Did not Complete/Has not Completed Primary School 1,2,3,4,5 
Primary School 6 
Paket A 6 
Did not Complete/Has not Completed Junior High School 7,8 
Junior High School (General) 9 
Junior High School (Vocational) 9 
Paket B 9 
Did not Complete/Has not Completed Senior High School 10,11 
Senior High School (General) 12 
Senior High School (Vocational) 12 
Paket C 12 
Diploma I/II 14 
Academy/Diploma III 15 
University 16 
Master/PhD 20 
     Note: Paket A, B, and C are for the informal school 
	
Table 6 shows the definition of the variables 
used in the research and the summary statistics. 
The respondents who met the criteria numbered 
49,001 individuals who consisted of 13,514 from 
IFLS3, 15,843 from IFLS4, and 19,644 from 
IFLS5. The average annual income of the 
respondent was Rp 5,789,102 with the deviation 
standard being Rp 7,621,662. The size of the 
deviation standard indicates a large inequality in 
incomes in Indonesia.  
The average duration of education for the 
respondents was 8.50 years with a deviation 
standard of 4.44 years. Respondents who had 
graduated from elementary school made up 24 
percent of the survey, 16 percent for junior high 
school, 27 percent for senior high school, 6 per-
cent held a diploma and 7 percent a bachelor’s 
degree.  
Workers who held the employment status of 
self-employed comprised 21 percent of the 
respondents, self-employed with help from 
temporary workers made up 20 percent and self-
employed with help from permanent workers 
were 2 percent. While workers with the 
employment status of government employees 
accounted for 8 percent and private sector 
employees made up 40 percent. Workers with 
the employment status of agricultural free 
workers were 3 percent and 6 percent were in 
non-agricultural fields.  
Based on the firms’ sizes, 57 percent of 
respondents worked at very small firms, small 
firms numbered 21 percent, medium firms 
accounted for 13 percent, and large firms were 
only 9 percent. Companies in the very small 
firms category were predominantly staffed by 
either self-employed workers or self-employed 
with help from temporary workers. This shows 
that much of the employment opportunities 
available to workers in Indonesia are in the 
informal sector, as opposed to the formal sector. 
Male respondents comprised 62 percent of 
the survey, and 89 percent were Muslim, while 
57 percent lived in cities. Based on their 
province of residence, 7 percent were from 
North Sumatra, 5 percent from West Sumatra, 4 
percent from South Sumatra, and 4 percent from 
Lampung. Next, the respondents who lived in 
Jakarta numbered 8 percent, 15 percent in West 
Java, 3 percent in Banten, 13 percent in Central 
Java, 6 percent in Yogyakarta and 14 percent in 
East Java. Respondents who lived outside of 
Sumatra and Java comprised of 5 percent from 
Bali, 6 percent from West Nusa Tenggara, 4 
percent from South Kalimantan, 5 percent from 
South Sulawesi and the remaining 2 percent 
from the other provinces.  
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Table 6. Definition of Variables and Statistical Summary 
Variable Definition of Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Yearly earnings Individual real income from work per 
year (in rupiah,2000 reference) 5,789,102 7,621,662 35,463 91,700,000 
Log y Natural log of individual earnings of 
work per year 14.90 1.25 10.48 18.33 
Educ  Years of Schooling 8.50 4.44 0 21 
Credential  	 	 	 	
Noschool < Elementary school 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Elm Elementary school 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Jhs Junior high school 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Shs Senior high school 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Diploma One-Two and Three years college 0.06 0.23 0 1 
University >=undergraduate university 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Characteristics 
of labor 
Exp 
Age  
Sex 
 
Mariage 
 
Islam 
 
City 
 
 
Potential work experience (years) 
Age of respondents in 2007 
Dummy variable male gender (Yes = 1. 
No = 0). 
Dummy variable marital status married 
(Yes = 1. No = 0). 
Dummy variable religion Islam (Yes = 1. 
No = 0). 
Dummy variable individuals living in 
urban areas (Yes = 1. No = 0). 
 
 
21.58 
37.07 
 
0.62 
 
0.77 
 
0.89 
 
0.57 
 
 
13.98 
11.90 
 
0.48 
 
0.42 
 
0.31 
 
0.49 
 
 
0 
15 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
58 
65 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Employment 
Status 
Sta_1 
 
Sta_2 
 
 
Sta_3 
 
 
Sta_4 
 
Sta_5 
 
Sta_7 
 
Sta_8 
 
 
Dummy variable  self employ-ment 
status (Yes = 1. No = 0). 
Dummy variable self employed with 
unpaid family worker/tem-porary worker 
(Yes=1, No=0). 
Dummy variable self employed with 
permanent worker (Yes=1, No=0). 
Dummy variable government worker 
(Yes=1, No=0). 
Dummy variable private worker (Yes=1, 
No=0). 
Dummy variable free worker in 
agriculture (Yes=1, No=0). 
Dummy variable free worker in non 
agriculture (Yes=1, No=0) 
 
 
 
0.21 
 
0.20 
 
 
0.02 
 
0.08 
 
0.40 
 
0.03 
 
0.06 
 
 
 
0.41 
 
0.40 
 
 
0.14 
 
0.28 
 
0.49 
 
0.16 
 
0.24 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
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Variable Definition of Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Firms size      
Very small Firm with < 5 employees 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Small  Firm with 5-20 employees 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Medium  Firm with 21-100 employees 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Big  Firm with >100 employees 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Location of 
Residence 
North Sumatera 
 
West Sumatera 
 
South 
Sumatera 
Lampung 
 
Jakarta 
 
West Java 
 
Banten 
 
Central Java 
 
Yogyakarta 
 
East Java 
 
Bali 
 
West Nuteng 
 
South 
Kalimantan 
South Sulawesi 
 
Others  
 
 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
North Sumatra (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
West Sumatra (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
South Sumatra (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
Lampung (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
Jakarta (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
West Java (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
Banten (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
Central Java (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
Yogyakarta (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
East Java (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
Bali (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
West Nusa Tenggara (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
South Kalimantan (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in the province of 
South Sulawesi (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
Dummy variable lives in another 
province (Yes = 1. No = 0) 
 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
0.05 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.08 
 
0.15 
 
0.03 
 
0.13 
 
0.06 
 
0.14 
 
0.05 
 
0.06 
 
0.04 
 
0.05 
 
0.02 
 
 
 
0.25 
 
0.21 
 
0.20 
 
0.19 
 
0.27 
 
0.35 
 
0.18 
 
0.34 
 
0.23 
 
0.35 
 
0.23 
 
0.24 
 
0.21 
 
0.21 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
2000 Survey 2000 as reference 0.28 0.45 0 1 
2007 Survey 2007 0.32 0.47 0 1 
2014 Survey 2014 0.40 0.49 0 1 
N Number of observation 49,001 
Source: IFLS 3, IFLS 4, and IFLS 5 
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EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The model in this paper refers to the study of 
Xiu and Gunderson (2013). In our paper, we 
made three models that included the human 
capital model, the signaling model and the 
hybrid model. These models were used to 
achieve the purpose of this essay and strengthen 
the empirical result.  
Model 1. Human capital model  
This is Mincer’s basic model according to 
the theory of human capital. The form of the 
equation is: log 𝑌2 = 𝛼, + 𝑟	𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 + 𝛿	𝐸𝑥𝑝2 + 𝛾	𝐸𝑥𝑝2= +𝑿2𝛽 + 𝑢2, 
where 𝑌2 is the income/wage of individual i. 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐2 is the years of schooling completed by 
individual i. 𝐸𝑥𝑝2 is the potential working 
experience, derived using the (age-educ-7) 
approach. 𝑿2 is a set of control variables that 
influence a person’s income. The years of 
schooling captures both the impact of human 
capital productivity from additional years of 
schooling as well as the impact of signaling from 
acquiring whatever credentials they obtained 
from completing key phases of their education. 
Model 2. Signaling Model (credentials model) 
This model based on the theory of signaling/ 
screening. The signal used is graduating from an 
educational level, or the certificates possessed by 
the worker. This signaling model has the form 
of: log 𝑌2 = 𝛼, + 𝜌𝑪𝑫2 + 𝛿	𝐸𝑥𝑝2 + 𝛾	𝐸𝑥𝑝2= +𝑿2𝛽 + 𝑢2  
where 𝑪𝑫 is a set of dummy credential variables 
that reflects both the impact of human capital 
productivity based on additional years of 
schooling, as well as the impact of signaling 
based on acquiring whatever credentials they 
obtained related to completing key phases of 
their education. The 𝑪𝑫	set in this case is 
elementary, junior high school, senior high 
school, diploma and university.  
Model 3. Hybrid model 
Model 3 is the hybrid model where both the 
years of schooling and credentials dummy 
variables are included. This model takes the 
form: log 𝑌2 = 𝛼, + 𝑟	𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐2 + 𝜌𝑪𝑫2 + 𝛿𝐸𝑥𝑝2 +𝛾𝐸𝑥𝑝2= + 𝑿2𝛽 + 𝑢2.  
This model enables us to separate the impact 
of human capital productivity based on addi-
tional years of schooling from the impact of 
signaling based on acquiring specific credentials. 
1.  Potential Ability Bias and Error 
Measurement  
The next potential problem is the estimation 
of the educational return that can be biased 
upwards as far as the endogenous education 
variable. In addition, the possibility of the 
estimation of the educational return also reflects 
unobserved factors, such as ability and moti-
vation correlated with income. Some research 
calculates the educational return by using an 
instrument variable to calculate the ability bias. 
Most of the results are contrary to expectations 
about the presence of an upward bias, their 
research using IV tends to generate estimated 
values that are greater than the OLS’s estima-
tion. The literature review indicates that estima-
tion is greater for educational returns with the 
OLS, due to a very small ability bias (Griliches, 
1977; Card, 1999). Card (1999: 1855) showed 
that estimations with the existing instrument 
variable that had been used to improve the 
ability bias were possible, and had a higher 
upward bias than the OLS’s estimations.  
Estimations with the instrument variable had 
a difficulty in finding an instrument for the 
educational variable. The instrument must be of 
the type that does not directly influence income, 
but has a strong relationship to education in the 
first stage of the equation. The instrument that is 
often used in the literature is related to the 
school system (for example the distance to the 
school) or has a characteristic of family back-
ground (parental education or siblings’ edu-
cation). The various instruments used by the 
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researchers are still much debated in the 
literature. The problem with the instrument in 
the case of Sheepskin’s analysis does not only 
involve the years of education, but also the 
various levels of education the respondents 
graduated from, so that the instrument’s 
determination is more difficult. A model made 
by the researcher involved five graduation 
variables and one education length variable, so 
at the very least it required six units of the 
instrument, each related to each decision of 
education that should not be associated with the 
omitted variable at the same time, and should not 
be associated with the outcome (Wooldridge, 
2012: 531). 
Based on the various considerations 
suggested above, we will not control any 
endogeneity in the education decision. We argue 
that: First, upward ability bias typically tends to 
be small, moreover there exists a downward bias 
due to the error measurement of education. 
Second, it is difficult to find the instrument that 
influences education, but does not influence 
income/revenue, especially in the signaling 
hypothesis model that involves many measures 
of the education variable. Third, the purpose of 
the research is to compare the human capital 
hypothesis and signaling hypothesis, so by using 
an instrument which is not in the three models, it 
may not provide a different conclusion (Xiu & 
Gunderson, 2013). 
RESULT OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS: 
THE HUMAN CAPITAL MODEL, THE 
SIGNALING MODEL AND THE HYBRID 
MODEL  
All three models use the natural log of 
income per year as the dependent variable with a 
control variable in accordance with the note in 
the table below. The result is presented in Table 
7. All the models have been tested using a robust 
standard error and we obtained results for the 
error standard that were similar to those found 
using the OLS. Therefore, our results are 
presented in the table based on the OLS results.  
The experience variable in these models has 
a diminishing effect on income. Because the 
coefficient of experience is positive, and the 
coefficient of experience squared is negative, 
this equation literally implies that, for low values 
of experience, any additional experience has a 
positive effect on income. However, at some 
point this effect becomes negative. 
Table 7. Estimation Result 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable logy logy logy 
Educ 0.0848***  0.0320*** 
 
(0.00162)  (0.00569) 
Elm  0.160*** 0.0387 
 
 (0.0158) (0.0264) 
Jhs  0.392*** 0.180*** 
 
 (0.0187) (0.0419) 
Shs  0.708*** 0.408*** 
 
 (0.0185) (0.0563) 
Diploma  1.073*** 0.698*** 
 
 (0.0273) (0.0717) 
University  1.238*** 0.807*** 
 
 (0.0266) (0.0809) 
Exp 0.0372*** 0.0416*** 0.0412*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Exp2 -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0006*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
_cons 13.11*** 13.39*** 13.31*** 
 
(0.0374) (0.0363) (0.0390) 
Control yes yes yes 𝑅=	 0.283 0.288 0.288 
N 49,001 49,001 49,001 
Note:  The first line indicates the coefficient value 
where the sign of *** is significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. The 
second line indicates the error standard. The 
control variables in this model are the 
characteristic of the worker, the dummy of 
employment status, dummy firm size, the 
dummy of regional status, and the dummy 
educational years (2000 reference). The 
characteristics of the worker are the gender, 
marital status, the dummy of urban living, and 
the dummy of religion. There are 7 dummies 
for the employment status where the dummy is 
trying to be used as its basis. The dummy of the 
regional uses the residence province where 
DKI Jakarta province is its basis. Full results 
can be found in the appendix  
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1. Human Capital Model  
Model 1 in Table 7 is a function of income 
based on human capital in which education is 
represented as the years of schooling. The result 
shows that each additional year of education is 
associated with an increase in wages of 8.48 
percent for the wages per year. The experience 
variable (exp) is a part of the control variable 
that provides an impact on an increase in income 
by 3.72 percent for first additional year of 
experience. This model provides the value of 𝑅= 
as being 28.3 percent. 
2. Signaling Model 
Model 2 in Table 7 is the signaling model, 
where education is represented as a set dummy 
of the education level variable. Respondents who 
did not graduate from elementary school are 
used as the basis of this dummy. The estimation 
result indicates that each school level has a 
positive impact on income, and the higher the 
level of education obtained, the greater the 
impact is. For example, for the model with 
annual income, the respondents who graduated 
from elementary school have a 16 percent higher 
income than the respondents who did not 
graduate from elementary school. Incomes for 
the graduates from junior high school are 39.2 
percent higher than for who did not graduate 
from elementary school. The income of 
graduates from senior high school is 70.8 
percent higher than that of those who did not 
graduate from elementary school. The income of 
graduates with diploma is 107.3 percent higher 
than that of those who did not graduate from 
elementary school. Those graduates having 
bachelor’s degrees and above have income that 
are 123.8 percent higher than those who did not 
graduate from elementary school.  
Model 2 has 0.5 percent of the value of 𝑅=, 
which is higher than in the first model. This 
result indicates that both of the models have 
relatively equal strength. This shows that edu-
cation in Indonesia also improves productivity. It 
can also be used as a signal to employers to look 
for the abilities of their prospective employees.  
3.  Hybrid Model 
The hybrid model is Model 3 in Table 7, 
where the education level is measured by the 
number of years of education and from the set of 
dummy credentials. The result shows that the 
impact of the number of years of education on 
annual incomes is 3.2 percent. This shows that 
the hypothesis of human capital is significant, 
although the impact is smaller than when using 
Model 1. Graduates of elementary schools in the 
equation of income per year are not significant, 
which indicates that the certificate for the 
completion of elementary school is not enough 
to increase incomes. While the graduates of 
junior high school, senior high school, and 
diploma, or degree holders in the equation are 
significant. The higher the level of education, the 
greater the changes are in the income level. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis of signaling.  
CONCLUSION 
The hypothesis of human capital in the first 
model is very significant, where each additional 
year of education can increase the annual income 
by 8.48 percent. The hypothesis of signaling in 
Model 2 also provides a very significant result, 
where the higher the level of education obtained, 
the greater is the additional income that can be 
earned.  
The hybrid model explains the impact of 
human capital that is seen from each additional 
year of education increasing the potential annual 
income by 3.2 percent, while the impact of 
signaling can be seen from the gaining of 
certificates, which is significant at the junior 
high school level and above. Based on the 
model, it can be concluded that education 
provides strong evidence to the equation for 
income, either viewed from the human capital 
theory aspect or the signaling theory aspect. 
Returns of years of schooling completed have 
smaller values on the hybrid model than on the 
human capital model, this is due to the existence 
of the returns of schooling level’s dummy. 
The impact of education, as seen from the 
signaling theory (Model 2) states that individuals 
from each level of education have higher 
2016 Hendajany et al. 205 
incomes than an individual who does not attend 
or complete any level of schooling. However, 
the hybrid model, with the dependent variable of 
income per year, is significant at the junior high 
school level and above. The implication of this 
policy that can be concluded from this result is 
that a primary education contributes to higher 
productivity than an intermediate education or 
above. This result can be a suggestion to the 
government to allocate more funds to basic 
education programs than for intermediate 
education or above. In addition, it can be used as 
the basis of empirical evidence for giving the 
suggestion to the government to declare an 
increase from 9 years compulsory education to 
12 years compulsory education. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn is that 
there is strong evidence that workers should 
invest in education, due to the increased 
productivity they gain from it, and the difference 
it makes to their salaries. The role of education 
in both the human capital theory and the 
signaling theory influences individuals’ 
decisions to invest in their education.  
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APPENDIX 
	
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log y Log y Log y 
Educ 0.0848***  0.0320*** 
 (0.00162)  (0.00569) 
Elm  0.160*** 0.0390 
  (0.0158) (0.0264) 
Jhs  0.392*** 0.180*** 
  (0.0187) (0.0419) 
Shs  0.709*** 0.409*** 
  (0.0185) (0.0563) 
Diploma  1.074*** 0.699*** 
  (0.0273) (0.0717) 
University  1.239*** 0.808*** 
  (0.0266) (0.0809) 
Exp 0.0372*** 0.0417*** 0.0413*** 
 (0.00144) (0.00146) (0.00146) 
Exp2 -0.000533*** -0.000665*** -0.000646*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Marriage 0.229*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
Sex 0.327*** 0.352*** 0.348*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Islam -0.0539*** -0.0376* -0.0354* 
 (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0206) 
City 0.199*** 0.203*** 0.199*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0111) 
Small_firm 0.133*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Medium_firm 0.329*** 0.306*** 0.306*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0172) 
Big_firm 0.621*** 0.608*** 0.609*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0185) 
Sta_2 0.261*** 0.265*** 0.263*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0149) (0.0149) 
Sta_3 0.908*** 0.891*** 0.889*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0345) 
Sta_4 0.580*** 0.503*** 0.500*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0220) (0.0220) 
Sta_5 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
Nortsumatra -0.313*** -0.296*** -0.300*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0256) 
Westsumatra -0.266*** -0.258*** -0.263*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) 
Southsumatra -0.309*** -0.311*** -0.315*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0291) (0.0291) 
Lampung -0.344*** -0.335*** -0.338*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
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Westjava -0.239*** -0.247*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0201) 
Banten -0.0554* -0.0594** -0.0574* 
 (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) 
Centraljava -0.530*** -0.535*** -0.532*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0215) 
Yogyakarta -0.567*** -0.573*** -0.575*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0259) 
Eastjava -0.330*** -0.341*** -0.338*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
Bali -0.205*** -0.216*** -0.210*** 
 (0.0315) (0.0313) (0.0313) 
Westnuteng -0.382*** -0.415*** -0.409*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0260) 
Southkalimantan -0.0265 -0.0337 -0.0357 
 (0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0285) 
Southsulawesi -0.374*** -0.393*** -0.389*** 
 (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0296) 
Others 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0389) (0.0389) 
T1 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
T2 0.344*** 0.352*** 0.349*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0122) 
Constant 13.11*** 13.38*** 13.30*** 
 (0.0374) (0.0363) (0.0389) 
Observations 49,001 49,001 49,001 
R-squared 0.284 0.289 0.289 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
	
